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little beyond the observation that it is rare to find situations, like the
one depicted, in which one process uniformly dominates the other
regardless of the unknown state of the world.
Fisher's next example is apparently intended to show the effect of
the discount rate on the choice of productive technique. Unfortunately,
the example chosen shows only that, of two techniques with the same
total costs, the one with relatively small near-term costs is preferable
at all positive discount rates, although Fisher refuses to accept this
obvious implication of his example.
The last example in this section is one in which cost depends on
several characteristics of the weapons system in question. It illustrates
the point that detailed knowledge may be needed concerning the re-
quirements for particular characteristics if costs are sensitive to the
characteristics.
The final substantive section of the paper concerns data problems.
This is the more interesting part of the paper and some significant
insights are presented. However, much of the section is a disguised
discussion of two well-known problems: whether to estimate a cost
function directly or to construct it from estimates of an underlying
production function; and whether to estimate production functions
from statistical data on inputs and outputs or to infer them from
engineering and scientific relationships. The answers obviously depend
on the precise purpose of the analysis, the assumptions made about
factor prices and factor markets, the identifiability of the relationships,
and on data availability and reliability. Although special problems
obviously arise in the national security area, I do not believe that
national security analysts have nothing to learn from the existing
literature on these matters.Cr
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engineers of bias toward cost underestimation rounds out the list.7
Details on these studies are provided later in the paper.
Scope and Nature of the Analysis
The analysis contained in this paper deals with the cost experience of
the three largest United States water-resource construction agencies—
the Army Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation and TVA—
from 1933 to the early 1960's. Data on cost experience of the Corps
of Engineers were obtained from (1) an analysis made by the Corps
in 1951 for the House Committee on Appropriations,8 and (2) a
followup survey by the Corps in Similarly, Bureau of Reclama-
tion cost experience data came from studies made by the Bureau in
1955 and 1960.'° Information on TVA experience was provided by
the TVA staff."
As an introduction to the analysis, a number of commonly held
notions on the occurrence of and reasons for systematic errors are
introduced. The actual experience of the three U.S. water-resource
agencies is then examined in detail, and the findings are analyzed in
terms of the preconceptions or hypotheses which had been advanced
and Report to the F-louse of Commons on the ElectricitySupplyIndustry, Session
Papers, Vol. 7, No. 116, 196 1—62, London, H.M.S.O., 1962.
R. Giguet and 0. Morlat, "Les Causes d'erreur systématique dans Ia pré-
vision du prix des travaux," Annales des Ponts et Chaussées, Paris, l22e Année,
No. 5, September—October 1952.
Robert Haveman reports (July 1968) that he and Terre!! Langworthy have
completed a study of cost experience on 86 Corps of Engineers water-resource
projects for which construction was started in fiscal year 1956.
8 U.S. Army, Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1951, Part 1, Vol. 3;
U.S. Congress, Investigation of Corps of Engineers,Civil WorksProgram, Hear-
ings beforeand Report of the Subcommittee on Deficiencies and Army Civil
Functions, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 82nd Con.
gress, 1st Session, August 1951; U.S. Congress, The Civil Functions Program of
the Corps of Engineers, Report to the Committee on Public Works from the Sub-
committee to Study Civil Works, House of Representatives, 82nd Congress, 2nd
Session, December 1952.
• Office of the Chief of Engineers, Headquarters, Department of the Army,
"Engineering and Design, Project Cost Estimating-Civil Works," Engineer-Circu-
lar No. 1110-2.1301, February 3, 1965. A large amount of detailed data not
contained in the Circular was provided by Mr. Wendell E. Johnson, Chief, En-
gineering Division, Civil Works, Office of the Chief of Engineers.
10 U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, "Analysis of Reclamation Projects," October
• 1955, citedin Altouney, op. cit.; "Analysis of Reclamation Projects," March 1960.
11 Internal TVA document entitled "Comparison of Estimates with Final
Costs:Major Multipurpose and Single-use Projects Constructed by TVA,"
November 15, 1967, plus supporting materials provided by TVA staff.I
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earlier. A brief review of information of British, Indian, and French
experience is presented. Finally, certain tentative conclusions are ad- re
vanced and recommendations made for further research on this neg- es
lected subject.
Perception of Errors in Cost Estimates tii
ai
The view most commonly advanced by the expert and the informed 111
layman is that costs of public works projects are consistently under-
estimated at the time the decision is taken to build the project. Asso-
ciated with this view is the belief that the variance between estimated T'
and actual costs is often extremely high. Much evidence on specific
cases is available to support this view: the Rayburn Office Building on
Capitol Hill and the Interstate Highway Program are dramatic cx- In
amples of this. The reader probably can supply many examples from
his own experience.
C
The following are the major reasons advanced for variations between at
cost estimates and final realized costs:
1. Changes in general construction price level between that assumed
C1
in the project cost estimate and that prevailing during construc-
A tion of the project.
2. Changes in the size and scope of project between original estimate
and final design and construction.
cC
3. Structural modifications and changes in design standards from
those assumed at time of original estimate.
4. Changes in the least-cost construction schedule assumed in the
original estimate; for example, "speedup" as in World War II or
0
stretch-out arising from budgetary constraints.
5. Occurrence of unforeseen events—strikes, floods—with impor-
tant cost implications.
Cr
6. Inadequate information of certain physical characteristics with
important cost implications; for example, insufficient knowledge
Ut
of dam foundation conditions, including character of soils and at
rock.
A 7. Inadequate information on extent and nature of relocations and
on land acquisition costs.
R 8. Unconscious bias toward underestimation of costs arising from
estimaters' identification with agency goals for maintaining a
d construction program.
d 9. General inadequacies and poor performance in planning and esti-
mating.I
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In the agency analyses of their cost experience, many of these
d- reasons are often given as explanations of major differences between
g- estimated and actual costs. Detailed analysis of estimated and realized
costs for individual projects in the context of the history of design and
construction of each project would be necessary to assess the contribu-
tion of these factors to cost increases or decreases. No such detailed
analyses were made by us; rather, we relied on information provided
in published reports or by the federal agencies.
The Cost Record of the U.S. Water Resource Agencies
In the following, the cost experiences of the Corps of Engineers, TVA,
and Bureau of Reclamation are summarized and the distribution of
m "errors" in the three agency programs are compared. Details of the
analyses are shown in the text tables and in the Appendix.
Corps of Engineers Experience
A 1951 study made by the Corps at the request of the House Appro-
priations Committee revealed that the 182 rivers and harbors and flood
control projects then current showed a total cost overrun of 124 per
cent of the original estimates.'2 The 1951 estimate of cost for these
projects was $5.9 billion as compared with the original project esti-
mates totaling $2.6 billion. Because original cost estimates for most
of these projects were made in the 1930's, it was to be expected that
price increase would account for much of this overrun. In the analysis
the Corps explained the overruns as follows: construction price in-
crease, 57.7 per cent; changes in project design, 24.7 per cent; exten-
sions in project scope, 17.6 per cent; changes in local needs and
unforeseen conditions, 12.6 per cent; and inadequacies in planning
and estimating, 5.8 per cent.
This record of performance came under criticism by the House
Appropriations Committee in 1951, a subcommittee of the House
Public Works Committee in 1952, and the Task Force on Water
Resources and Power of the Second Hoover Commission in 1955.
The House Appropriations Committee concluded that investment
decisions made by Congress were based on grossly inaccurate cost
data. Major reasons advanced by the Committee were the inadequacy
12Areminder: cost is defined throughout as construction or capital cost.
________jI
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of the survey reports, which were too superficial to provide accurate
cost information, and the large backlog of projects that imposed a time
lag of many years between completion of original survey and start of
construction. Thus, cost estimates for the original project were often
drastically increased as local conditions changed, new demands arose,
and engineering and structural design standards were modified.
These critics strongly recommended that the Corps improve its esti-
mating procedures, curtail new authorizations until the backlog was
reduced, and provide a detailed planning report, with refined cost data,
at the time when requests were made for funds to start a project.
In 1964, the Corps of Engineers updated its survey of cost experi-
ence in an analysis of 184 projects completed during the period 195 1—
64 (technically, fiscal years 195 This survey revealed that
total costs of $3.14 billion exceeded the original project estimates of
$2.31 billion by 36.1 per cent. This represented a substantial improve-
ment over the 124 per cent overrun in the 1951 survey. When the
original cost estimates were adjusted to account for price changes be-
tween time of original estimate and time of actual construction, actual
costs were 18.3 per cent less than escalated survey costs. This record
is in sharp contrast to the 1951 record which showed actual costs to be
30 per cent greater than escalated survey costs.
Because many of the projects reported in the 1964 analysis had
been originally surveyed before 1950, a separate analysis was made
by us of sixty-eight projects for which the original survey had been
made in 1954 or later. This analysis revealed that the total of actual
cost and original estimated costs were less than 1 per cent apart; when
price level adjustments were made, actual cost for the sixty-eight
projects was 23 per cent below original estimated cost. These data
clearly show that the Corps has significantly improved its performance
since the early 1950's, when its cost estimating record first came under
severe criticism by the Congress.
The Corps left to each of its districts the selection of the precise
method for construction price level adjustments. Most districts used
the Engineering News-Record construction cost index. A single na-
tional index is only a crude approximation of actual price changes
operative for an individual project. When applied to projects with a
long time lag between survey and completion, price index adjustments
become very large. For example, ENR construction price index ad-
justments for projects with lags of fifteen to thirty-four years range
from 100 per cent to 336 per cent above base-year levels. Such large


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































274 The Analysis of Public Output
price adjustments made with a crude index tend to distort the true
relationship of price adjustment to other factors contributing to project
overruns.
Corps of Engineers estimating performance is summarized in Table
1 below. The total overrun (or underrun) is shown as a per cent of
original and escalated survey costs. In addition, the frequency of over-
runs as a per cent of total number of projects is shown, both for
original and escalated survey costs.
The T1'A Experience
The TVA has provided data on cost experience of thirty-four projects
with costs in excess of $1 million. These projects, many of which were
started during the 1930's, include twenty-three multiple-purpose dams
and reservoirs, nine fossil fired electric generating plants, one flood
protection project, and one water control system. Because many of the
projects were built in stages, TVA provided data on sixty-one separate
project units.
As shown in Table 2, the actual cost of the thirty-four projects
($2.33 billion)is $130 million below the original estimates of cost
TABLE 2
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
SUMMARY OF ESTIMATING PERFORMANCE
Period of record 1933—66
Number of projects 34
Number of separate estimates 61
Estimated costs (billions of dollars) 2.46a
Actual costs (billions of dollars) 2.33
Overrun (per cent of survey costs)
Frequency of overruns (per cent of occurrence)
Independent projects 32.4
Separate estimates 34.4
a Whereverpossible TVA includes projected price increases initsoriginal
estimate. Thus no separate escalated estimates are provided. Interest during
construction included for some steam plant cost estimates and final costs. See
Appendix Table 5.
b Underrun.
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of $2.46 billion; this represents a total cost underrun of 5.3 per cent.
Approximately one-third of the thirty-four projects, and, similarly,
approximately one-third of the sixty-one project units, have experi-
enced cost overruns. In terms of project type, none of the fourteen
cost estimates for steam plant units has been less than final costs;
total cost underrun for steam p'ants is 9.3 per cent. In contrast, 45
per cent of the estimates for dams and reservoirs have been less than
final project costs; total overrun for this category is 21.7 per cent of
estimated cost. Most of these overruns occurred on projects which
were built or begun during World War II, when stoppages or accelerated
construction was the rule.
Bureau of Reclamation Experience
In common with the Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation
performance on cost estimation came under critical scrutiny by Con-
gress in 1955. The Bureau report of 1955 has been summarized and
analyzed by Altouney, and the analysis of 1955 data presented here
is derived from Appendix Table 5 in his report.'4
Table 3 shows that, for the 103 projects in the 1955 survey, total
estimated 1955 cost of $7.3 billion was 177 per cent above the
original estimates of $2.6 billion, and almost double the escalated
estimates ($3.7 billion) which reflect adjustments for construction
price rises between times of original estimates and 1955. (The Bureau
of Reclamation usesits own index of constructionprices which
reflectsprice changes inthe major labor and material inputs to
Reclamation projects.) Furthermore almost 90 per cent of all projects
showed cost overruns from the original estimate, whether measured
on nominal or escalated cost basis. In most cases, the 1955 costs
were not final project costs, but were current cost estimates for
projects not yet completed.
A subsequent review by the Bureau of Reclamation in 1960 showed
a substantial improvement in performance over the 1955 record. Data
in the report have been disaggregated to show performance on all
projects (128) started between 1935 and 1960, a subset of seventy-
nine projects over the same period which excludes units in the
Missouri River Basin and Colorado River Storage Projects, and a
subset of fifty-four projects surveyed and started since World War II.
The seventy-nine projects exclusive of the MRBP and CRSP showed


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































LSystematic Errors in Cost Estimates 277
a total overrun of 36 per cent of original estimates, and 13 per cent
of original estimates adjusted for price increases. The record for the
fifty-four projects surveyed and started since World War II shows a
total overrun of 9.4 per cent of original estimates, and an underrun
of 4.1 per cent of escalated estimates. The 1960 study includes
projects under construction as well as those finally completed. For
example, in Table 3, of the seventy-nine projects exclusive of CRSP
and MRBP, fourteen were not completed at the time of the study in
1960. Some of these were only at the beginning stage of construction.
Similarly, of the fifty-four projects begun after World War II,six
were not completed in 1960. Final costs for these projects may be
considerably different than the 1960 estimates.
Comparison of Agency Performance
To aid in comparing agency performance on cost estimation, summary
data for the three agencies are brought together in Table 4. In terms
of both size and frequency of overrun, the TVA has the best record.
TVA performance is best, even with the steam plants eliminated from
the analysis. With no adjustments for construction price levels, TVA
total overrun for dams and reservoirs is 22 per cent of original esti-
mated cost; Corps of Engineers overrun is 124 per cent for projects
built or building prior to 1951, and 36 per cent for projects completed
between 195! and 1964; while Bureau of Reclamation overrun is
177 per cent for projects built or building prior to 1955 and 72 per
cent for all projects built or building in 1960. In terms of frequency
of overruns, 45 per cent of TVA dams and reservoirs experienced
overruns; the record for the Corps of Engineers is 72 per cent of all
projects completed between 1951 and 1964, and, for the Bureau of
Reclamation, 89 per cent of all projects built or building prior to
1955, and 75 per cent of all projects built or building in 1960.
The performance record of both the Corps of Engineers and Bureau
of Reclamation is much better on projects for which surveys (and
hence cost estimates) were made after World War II. For example,
actual cost of sixty-eight Corps of Engineers projects surveyed, author-
ized and built between 1954 and 1964 was 0.2 per cent below esti-
mated costs for the projects. For fifty-four Bureau of Reclamation
projects surveyed, authorized and built or building between 1946 and
1960, actual costs were only 9.4 per cent above cost estimates. In
the case of each agency, frequency of overruns was slightly over 50
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D is TR I BUT ION OF ERRORSAnanalysis of distribution of errors
was made for each agency program. The detailed distributions are
shown in Appendix Figures 1 through 6. A summary of the means,
modes, medians, standard deviations, and extreme values in terms of
per cent of deviation of actual cost from estimated cost is contained
in Table 5. Again, the TVA has the best record, with mean, mode and
median errors showing underruns, and with a standard deviation of
17.5 per cent. In contrast, best performance of the Corps of Engineers,
on projects surveyed and built between 1954 and 1964, shows mean
and median errors as overruns and a relatively high standard deviation
of 45 per cent. For Bureau of Reclamation projects at least 50 per
cent complete by 1960, mean error was 25.8 per cent, median error,
3 per cent, and standard deviation 42 per cent.
Summary of Performance
In summary, the TVA program and recent Corps of Engineers experi-
ence (even with no construction price level adjustments for Corps
projects) show no consistent bias toward underestimation of project
costs. When construction price level adjustments are made for the
most recent Bureau of Reclamation program, it too shows no bias
toward underestimation. (This assumes that price level adjustments
are approximately correct; some information on price adjustments is
contained in Appendix Table 4.)
Whatever the measure used (magnitude or frequency of overrun,
or distribution of errors), recent estimating performance of the Corps
of Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation has improved significantly
over performance before World War II and in the 1940's. For the
Corps of Engineers, project cost estimates made since 1954 have been
significantly better than previous estimates in that total cost overrun
as per cent of total program cost has been reduced to 10 per cent
without any adjustment for construction cost increases. This compares
with a huge cost overrun of 124 per cent according to a 1951 survey
of projects whose costs were estimated in the 1930's and 1940's.
Similarly, the 9.4 per cent total cost overrun for Bureau of Reclamation
projects surveyed since World War II shows a tremendous improve-
ment over the 177 per cent cost overrun revealed in a 1955 survey for
projects surveyed in the 1930's and 1940's.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1Systematic Errors in Cost Estimates 281
Although the TVA record has been more consistent throughout the
thirty-three-year period of its activity, there is some evidence that its
recent cost estimating performance is better than its earlier record.
The Causes of Error
In the agency analysis of cost experience, the deviations of actual from
estimated cost are ascribed to various factors, some of which are iden-
tical with the nine reasons advanced in the Introduction to this paper.
These factors, which may be thought of as proximate causes of error,
can be divided into exogenous factors, over which the agency has
little or no control, and endogenous factors, which can be modified by
improving agency administration.
Proximate Causes
In the Corps of Engineers 1951 survey, about 58 per cent of the $2.8
billion excess of actual over estimated cost was ascribed to price
increases and another 22 per cent was traced to authorized project
extensions or changed local needs (see Table 1in the Appendix).
These causes are largely exogenous; the agency has no control over
general construction price increases, and increases in project size and
scope are usually the result of demands arising outside of the agency.
The remaining 20 per cent of excess cost, ascribed to structural and
engineering modifications, unforeseen conditions and inadequacies in
planning, are largely subject to agency control. In analyzing the Corps
1951 survey, a House Appropriations Subcommittee report pointed
to the following weaknesses in the Corps' performance:
(a) Price increase arising from structural modifications were over
10 per cent of estimated project cost in one-third of the proj-
ects; approximately one-sixth of the projects had price increases
exceeding 40 per cent; the largest relative increase was 727
per cent;
(b) unforeseen conditions caused price increases of 10 per cent or
more on 38 per cent of the projects; increases of 40 per cent
or more showed up on 20 per cent of the projects; the largest
increase was 502 per cent;282 The Analysis of Public Output
(c)increased relocation costs were an important factor; for the 182
projects, average increase in relocation costs was 177 per cent;
some relocation costs were up to fifty times the original esti-
mate;
(d) increases in land acquisition costs averaged 123 per cent, in
part caused by a 42 per cent increase in total acreage required;
the largest relative increase of acreage for a single project was
287 per cent;
(e) cost increases ascribed to general inadequacies in planning and
estimating (presumably because the increases were otherwise
unaccounted for) were in excess of 10 per cent for 28 per cent
of the projects; the largest relative increase was 217 per cent.
Much of the cost increase can be traced to the long time lag between
project conception in the survey stage and actual construction. This
problem of lag was aggravated by World War II; during the years
1941—1945 water resources construction was effectively suspended.
Also significant, however, was the fact that project plans and cost
estimates were often based on very sketchy information and inadequate
analytical techniques. This was particularly true of surveys completed
before and during World War II.
Corps of Engineers, 1964 Report
Of the 184 projects reported in this survey, forty-three had actual costs
more than 10 per cent in excess of the original estimates adjusted to
take account of construction price increases. These excess costs, which
amounted to $177 million, were distributed as follows:
Land acquisition 14 per cent
Relocation 31 per cent
Design changes 51 per cent
Higher bid prices than expected 4 per cent
Of fifteen cases of increased land acquisition costs, four were traced
to rises in land values and eleven involved changes in project scope.
Relocation costs were increased because of increases in project scope
and adoption of new legal or administrative criteria and changed design
standards, requiring, for instance, rebuilding of roads to higher stand-
ards than those of existing roads. One-third of the design changes were
ascribed to increases in project scope and two-thirds to geologic and
hydraulic conditions different from those assumed at the survey stage.Systematic Errors in Cost Estimates 283
It is difficult to make a clear separation between exogenous and
endogenous factors influencing costs from the sketchy data of the
1964 report. Increase in land values, new legal requirements and
changes in project scope are largely exogenous; these factors account
for 43 per cent of all reasons cited as causes of increases. On the other
hand, design changes probably reflect both exogenous factors, such
as new conditions arising from delay between survey and construction
stages, and endogenous factors associated with inadequate information
at the survey stage.
Tennessee Valley Authority
Examination of the explanations provided by TVA for major cost over-
runs reveals the following:
(a) Changes in project construction schedules were an important
factor, especially during World War II. Some projects, under
construction when the U.S. entered the war, were stopped in
1942 and resumed only the after war; construction was acceler-
ated on a few key projects during the war, thus increasing
costs; in addition, there were a few instances of schedule
stretchout due to delayed or reduced appropriations by Con-
gress;
(b) in some cases, appropriations for construction were made be-
fore cost estimates were completed; this was the case for six
dams begun in 1936 and for a later project constructed on an
emergency basis;
(c)in only a few cases did changes in project scope increase costs
significantly; also, there were few situations where costs in-
creased because local conditions were different than anticipated.
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION. For seventy-nine projects (exclusive
of project units in the Colorado River Storage Project and Missouri
River Basin Program) surveyed by the Bureau of Reclamation in 1960,
55 per cent of the total increase in project costs was ascribed by the
Bureau to exogenous price increases. Changes in project scope ac-
counted for 22 per cent; reanalysis of work quantities and unit costs
was responsible for another 12 per cent. The remaining 11 per cent
was attributed to unforeseen conditions, structural modifications and
miscellaneous reasons. Exogenous factors (price increases, changes in
project plans) accounted for almost 80 per cent of the increase, but284 The Analysis of Public Output
the remaining 20 per cent ascribed to controllable factors provides a
significant opportunity for improvement by the agency.
Underlying Factors Influencing Accuracy of Cost Estimates
The underlying factors fall into two broad classes: those related to the
project and the timing of survey and construction—type, size, corn-
plexity, time lag between survey and construction; and those related
to the administrative and institutional frarnework—nature of pre-
authorization surveys, organizational structure, estimating pressures
and biases. Major findings with respect to these factors are presented
here :16detailsare contained in the Appendix tables.
Factors Related to Projects and Their Timing
PROJECT TV P E. Type of project clearly influences the accuracy of
the estimates. As shown in Table 6 and Appendix Table 2, Corps of
Engineer flood control projects(levees, channel excavation, flood
control reservoirs, local protection works) have a higher total and
greater frequency of cost overruns than rivers and harbors projects
(dredging, harbor construction, locks and dams including power facili-
ties and multiple purpose dams with power facilities). This inferior
performance of flood control projects is maintained when construction
price adjustment is applied to original estimates for both rivers and
harbors and flood control projects. In terms of project subtypes, fre-
quency of overrun isleast for dredging and locks and dams, and
greatest for local protection works and reservoirs—flood control and
multipurpose. Cost estimation for dredging is relatively straightforward
and involves few uncertainties. On the other hand, local protection
projects often require land acquisition and extensive relocations in
urban settings. Changes in land values are important factors, especially
when there is a long time lag between survey and construction. In the
case of storage reservoirs, geological and hydrological uncertainties
are important elements leading to cost increases. Poor foundation
conditions not anticipated at the survey stage can increase costs signifi-
cantly, as can design changes involving large increases in spillway size
occasioned by occurrence of large floods between time of survey and
time of detailed project design.
Theanalysis is in single-factor form. Because of small sample sizes, a multi-
factor statistical analysis was not undertaken. We recognize that some factors





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































s286 The Analysis of Public Output
TABLE 7
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY ges
ESTIMATING PERFORMANCE BY PROJECT TYPE
Dams Steam Plants
Number of estimates 40 14
Original estimate (millions of dollars) 896.Ia 1565.0
Actual cost (millions of dollars) 915.6a 1415.1
Total overrun (per Cent) 21.7k _9.6b
Frequency of overruns (per cent) 45.0 None re(
Distribution of errors (per cent)
Mean +8.25 —10.71
Mode +7.5 —12.5 El
Median —1.6 —10.4
Standard deviation 18.2 6.1
S
Maximum overrun 50.0 None
Maximum underrun 33.0 21.8
to
el
aFor47 estimates including miscellaneous projectsrelated to dams and
reservoirs.
b Underrun.
Table 7 shows the striking difference between cost estimating experi-
ence of TVA with dams and steam plants. The obvious explanation
is the relative freedom from estimating uncertainties in the steam plant
case. These are summarized for steam plants by TVA as follows:
(1) Area and cost of land for site are fairly well known at the
outset;
(2) unforeseen foundation conditions do not greatly affect total
costs;
a
(3)a large percentage of total cost is for equipment (for which
A
cost estimates are fairly firm);
(4) good data are available on past experience for similar projects;
(5) setbacks due to floods or bad weather are improbable;
(6) good prospect of only small changes, affecting cost, between
initial planning and final design.
PROJECT SIZE. The data show no conclusive evidence that project
size (in terms of total estimated cost) is related to frequency of over-
runs. Altouney found no evidence of such correlation in his analysis ofSystematic Errors in Cost Estimates 287
projects in the 1955 Bureau of Reclamation study.'T TVA data sug-
gests an inverse relationship between size of project and frequency of
overrun, as shown by the following:




However, many of the large projects are steam plants and the good
record of the large projects is probably more related to the nature of
the projects than to their size.
No detailed analysis of influence of size was made for Corps of
Engineers projects, but we consider it unlikely that such analysis would
show significant correlations that are independent of other factors.
PROJECT TIMING. The timing of project construction in relation
to completion of the project survey is important on two counts. When
elapsed time between survey and construction is long, increase in con-
struction prices becomes important and actual costs due to this cause
alone turn out to be very much larger than estimated cost. For example,
using the ENR construction cost index as the measure of price change,
a project whose costs were estimated on the basis of 1950 prices would
almost double in cost if built in 1965—a time lag of fifteen years.
TVA's good record on costs is in part due to the extremely short time
lag between completion of survey and start of construction (usually
not more than two years). This allows TVA to base its estimates on
short-term projected prices.'8
The second consequence of long time lag concerns changes in
project scope and in design standards. Typically these operate to in-
crease project costs. This is shown in the Corps of Engineers data.
After adjusting for construction prices, the 119 Corps projects with
time lags up to fourteen years have a 28 per cent frequency of overrun,
while 38 per cent of the sixty-six Corps projects with time lags of
fifteen to thirty-four years have experienced overruns.
Calendar time also appears to be an important factor. Corps of
Altouney,op. cit. p. 48.
TVAmakes its estimates on the basis of man-hours where possible, and
makes separate estimates of projected increases in cost of labor, materials and
equipment, rather than applying a single price adjustment factor to a current
price estimate.
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Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation projects which were surveyed
before World War II have poor performance records on costs, as
revealed by the 1951 and 1955 studies.19 In contrast, the record of
both agencies is much better for projects with surveys completed since
World War H. For TVA, cost overruns were most serious for projects
built during World War II, when unusual conditions prevailed in the
construction industry.
In summary, time lag between survey and construction is an ex-
tremely important factor; fortunately, this factor is amenable to ad-
ministrative and policy control.
Factors Related to Nature of Planning and Decision Process
There is considerable variation among water resource agencies on the
procedure followed in obtaining authorization and appropriations for
projects. The Corps of Engineers submits a project or river basin
survey report to the Congress (after Presidential clearance) to serve
as a basis for authorization of the work. The cost estimate prepared
at this survey stage is an input to the benefit-cost analysis which Con-
gress relies upon, in part, for making its decision on authorization.
Typically authorization acts (Omnibus River and Harbors or Flood
Control Acts) are enacted every two years. There may thus be a delay
of as much as two or three years between date of cost estimate and
authorization of the project. A separate procedure to obtain appro-
priations for the project must then be followed, which usually involves
an additional year or two of delay. Delays of three or four years are
common and some projects have even longer lags. Although project
costs (and benefits) are updated at the time decisions are made to
appropriate funds, the authorization decision is usually the controlling
decision on whether to proceed with construction. It is not surprising,
therefore,that actual costs deviate significantly from the original
estimates, especially when the level of precision of cost estimating at
the survey stage is considerably less than that appropriate for the
engineering design stage.
Bureau of Reclamation procedures are generally similar to those of
the Corps in that projects also must proceed through separate author-
izing and funding stages. In contrast, the TVA project authorization
step is an internal decision of the Board of Directors, usually followed
Seefootnotes 4 and 8 above.
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expeditiously with a request to the President and Congress for appro-
priations or authority to commit TVA corporate funds. In most cases,
the time lag is short and project cost estimates are quite realistic.
The probable influence of authorizing and funding procedures is
revealed by a comparison of the standard deviation of estimating
errors of TVA and the Corps of Engineers, as shown in Table 5. For
TVA projects, the standard deviation of error (as a per cent of esti-
mated project cost) is 18, while for Corps of Engineers projects built
since 1954 (which reflect the best record of the Corps) the standard
deviation is 33, after price level adjustments have been made.
UNITARY VERSUS DECENTRALIZED ADMINISTRATION. TVA
operations are managed from a single headquarters staff with central-
ized control of planning, estimating, design and construction. TVA
has an excellent record of staff continuity allowing the agency to reap
the benefits of cumulative experience. In contrast, the Corps of En-
gineers, with a nationwide program much larger than that of TVA,
operates on a decentralized basis with thirty-seven districts and eleven
intermediate divisions, which report to the Office of the Chief of
Engineers in Washington.
From the standpoint of size of program and geographical scope,
TVA project planning and construction (in contrast toits major
power operations) is probably comparable to civil works planning and
construction in a division of the Corps. TVA cost estimating per-
formance is better than the performance of the Corps as a whole. Yet
there are significant differences in performance among Corps divisions.
As shown in detail in Appendix Table 3, for projects surveyed and
built since 1954, the North Central and South Atlantic divisions had
the lowest frequency of cost overruns (15 per cent and 22 per cent,
respectively) while the Ohio River, and North Pacific had the highest
frequencies (100 per cent).
Because frequency of overrun may also be influenced by project
type, a separate analysis was made of projects included in the 1964
report to account for this factor. As shown in Appendix Table 3, the
ratio of actual to expected overruns was computed for each Corps of
Engineers division, based on the project mix of each division. On this
basis, the North Central, North Atlantic and South Atlantic divisions
had significantly better performance records than the others, while the
Ohio River and North Pacific divisions again had the poorest record.
Project mix did not change the rankings significantly.290 The Analysis of Public Output
METHOD OF PROJECT CONSTRUCTION. TVA performs all con-
struction itself by force account while the Corps of Engineers and
Bureau of Reclamation rely almost entirely on independent contractors
via competitive bidding.It would appear that competitive bidding
should lead to more economical construction than force account. But
the TVA has made efficient use of force account, because it has had
relatively close control of its construction schedule. Within limits it
has been able to schedule construction to make best use of its admin-
istrative and supervisory personnel. It operates with the relative cer-
tainty of well-known labor costs and productivity levels and centralized
management.
The Corps of Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation, on the other
hand, are subject to both the positive and negative aspects of dealing
with independent contractors and independent labor forces. This is
likely to result in a highly variable performance, with economies
achieved when construction work is slack and bidders are competing
vigorously, and higher than normal costs the rule when construction
work is plentiful. Although we cannot quantify the importance of this
factor in our study, the over-all record of TVA performance indicates
that its use of force account has led to important economies.
INSTITUTIONAL BIASES. Planners, designers and estimators are
always subject to some environmental pressures in the performance of
their work. Can any of these factors affect performance in a consistent
fashion, thus leading to an unconscious bias? All three agencies oper-
ate within an institutional momentum that provides incentive for doing
things, that is, with some oversimplification, to build as many projects
as possible. Because economic justification (a favorable benefit-cost
ratio)is a necessary condition for obtaining project authorization,
there is a definite advantage in maintaining cost estimates as low as
possible. The countervailing pressures are the legitimate professional
pride of estimators in a task well done. They strive to provide correct
information and to be accurate. They are sensitive to the penalties for
poor work—criticism of their professional peers, and unfavorable
criticism of their agency by Congress and the informed public. It is
impossible to gauge accurately the relative weights of these opposing
pressures and any judgment would be very rash. It would seem how-
ever that the pressures placed upon the Corps of Engineers and
Bureau of Reclamation by their relationships with local interests, their
greater dependence upon Congressional committees for support andSystematic Errors in Cost Estimates 291
the widespread impact of their programs are at least outwardly much
stronger than those imposed upon TVA. All three agencies have a
strong professional pride and this factor may well be dominant. The
striking improvement in performance by the Corps and the Bureau
since 1951 is an indication of this factor in operation.
Secular Changes over Time
The most obvious secular change associated with improvement of
performance isthe accumulation of experience including increased
knowledge of the areas under the jurisdiction of the agencies and
increased awareness of the major sources of problems. A second
factor, which cannot be measured easily but can be safely assumed,
is the improvement in the management of the agencies, the increased
professionalization of staffs and improved working procedures. A third
factor, which has been particularly important in removing elements
of uncertainty at the planning-estimating stage,isthe considerable
improvement in engineering knowledge and skills that has affected
every step of design and construction. Geological and geophysical
survey techniques have improved the advance information obtainable
at costs within the bounds of preliminary surveys; construction methods
provide greater certainty as to the requirements of certain operations
(for instance in determining the exact overbreakage required and
feasible in rock excavation work). Thus, improved engineering not
only increases the effectiveness of construction operations, but, by
providing better information, allows for more accurate estimates at
the survey stage.
Some Evidence from India, Great Britain and France
In an analysis of thirteen hydroelectric power and irrigation projects
built in India during the period 1946—60, Healey found a consistent
high bias toward underestimation of costs.2° As shown in Appendix
Table 10, total cost overrun for the thirteen projects was 41.3 per cent
of estimated cost. Maximum overrun was 230 per cent and minimum
overrun 5 per cent of estimated costs. The very large overruns are
ascribed to the following causes in the following proportions:
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(a) Poor planning and management, 50 per cent; inadequate or
wrong information from preliminaryinvestigations;major
changes in project scope due to misinterpretation of project
purpose and potential (ignorance of the real production func-
tion); considerable mismanagement at site; delays; over supply
of equipment; failure to call for tenders;
(b) price increases, 25 per cent; a detailed analysis of cost compo-
nents show that price increases are not the major factor;
(c) unexplained, 25 per cent—which is probably due to estimating
errors.
Healey explains the dominance of poor planning and management as
a cause of error by the great difficulty of estimating overhead costs
and of implementing proper accounting and management controls in
a developing country.
A Select Committee on Nationalized Industries in Great Britain
discovered even larger, and more consistently substantial, errors in
a 1957 study of the experience of the North of Scotland Hydro-
Electric Board.2' Details are shown in Appendix Table 10. The Com-
mittee found two major causes for the large difference (107.5 per
cent) between actual and estimated costs: price increases, and the
inexperience of the managing authority established after the war. The
Committee made a number of administrative recommendations to
improve the situation and requested that annual reviews be made of
estimates and costs for allprojects. The possibility of substantial
improvement in procedures is revealed by the results of the Com-
mittee's second investigation, in 1962. The improvement is particu-
larly striking in the projects designed between 1951 and 1955 (before
the first Committee report but after some 17 years of experience).
The overrun was reduced to 6.6 per cent of estimated cost.
A Statistical Approach: France
In 1952 two engineers of Electricité de France published a statistical
analysis tending to demonstrate the existence of a bias toward under-
estimation independent of the optimism or the deliberate attitudes of
the estimators.22 They accept the bias as a fact and seek to remove part
of the responsibility for its existence from the shoulders of the esti-
mators. They made two separate analyses of the problem:
21 Select Committee on Nationalized Industries in Great Britain, op. cit.
22 Giguet et Morlat, op. cit.
A—a---—-
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(a) Dissymmetry of the probability distribution of errors. The major
factors that cause project costs to be greater than estimates are
not independent but related. The engineers who design projects
will determine the probability of existence of such factors (for
instance unsound rock in a tunnel excavation) and wiil design
so as to minimize the probability of occurrence of costly events.
Whenever such events occur, the actual cost of projects will
increase so that over the long run the mean value of actual
project costs will be larger than the value estimated as most
probable.
(b) Systematic program errors. The authors postulate a list of pos-
sible projects from which only a limited number will be selected
and a normal distribution of errors (under- and over-estimates)
of mean zero. The projects to be chosen are those which, for
equal benefits, are estimated to have a cost lower than a given
cut-off cost (Yo) determined by budgetary constraints. These
projects will be (1) those with an actual cost (x) equal to the
estimated cost (y), (2) those which, because of errors in the
estimates, have actual costs greater than estimated costs and
(3)(as demonstrated by the authors) some projects which
have been overestimated, but which, because of the presence
of the limit y0, have a smaller proportional error than the
underestimated projects. Projects which have been overesti-
mated and are expected to cost more than the cut-off budget
(y > y0) will not be chosen although their actual cost would
haveturned out to be less thanThus, the actual cost of the
totalprogram will be greater than estimated and the size of the
overrun will be inversely proportional to the percentage of
projects to be selected from the list (as determined by the value
ofYo).
Although this brief summary does not do justice to Giguet and
Morlat's statistical analysis, it is difficult to accept the generalvalidity
of their statement. Itsvalidity becomes more evident when considering
limitcases: if a very small proportion of the total list is to be selected,
those projects with the largest underestimation (for a given level of net
benefits)will receive priority; conversely,if the total listis to be
implemented, the distribution of errors will be normal, as assumed,
and the average error of the estimates will be zero.
Both analyses rely on a number of constraining assumptions that
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of the few known attempts to formulate an explanation for the peren-
mal problem of systematic bias it opens new perspectives for research.
Findings and Implications for Public Works Policy
and Administration
Our analysis has shown a significant difference among agencies in the
accuracy of cost estimates. TVA, with the best record, has more
organizational autonomy and a more centralized administration than
the other agencies. This leads to the tentative conclusion that organ-
izational and administrative context is the important variable influenc-
ing cost estimation performance.
A second finding is that the agencies have achieved very great im-
provements in estimating performance since the early 1950's. The poor
performance of the Corps and the Bureau prior to 1950 can be attri-
buted to the unusual conditions of the 1930's and the immediate post-
war years. Agency planning staffs had grown rapidly during the 1930's,
had been decimated during the war and were again built up rapidly
immediately after the war. Pressures to complete survey reports were
strong, and the information required for accurate cost estimates was
often seriously deficient. Spurred by the Congressional criticism of
the early 1950's, the agencies worked to improve their planning and
cost estimating procedures and techniques. Technological change and
improvements in engineering design skills have been positive factors
also. The results were impressive: recent estimating performance by
the Corps and the Bureau has begun to approach the good record
of TVA.
The third important finding is that current performance of these
agencies shows no significant bias toward underestimation of project
costs. TVA, which uses projected construction costs and has a short
lag period between completion of survey and start of construction, now
makes estimates which are typically within 10 per cent of realized costs;
recent bias has been toward overestimation. The Corps of Engineers,
which typically encounters long time lags between survey and con-
struction and which computes costs on a current price basis, still shows,
in its performance since 1954, actual costs running higher than esti-
mated costs. When adjustments are made for price increases, however,
this bias disappears. Recognizing the many uncertainties associated
with the data, including the crudity of the price adjustments, one can
Ar
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say that recent Corps performance (in contrast to earlier performance)
shows no obvious bias toward underestimation of real costs.
The fourth point to be made is that recent agency experience reveals
persistence of a sizable variance of error, in spite of the great im-
provements shown over earlier performance. To the extent that this
wide spread is not traceable to changes in project scope or purpose,
there is opportunity to reduce it through improving planning methods
and cost estimating techniques.
The major technical factor which contributes to error in estimation
is physical uncertainty; in water-resource projects the most important
uncertainties involve geologic structure and hydrologic regime. Esti-
mates at the survey stage must usually be based on incomplete informa-
tion on these physicalaspects. When more complete information
becomes available at the design or construction stage, "bad" geologic
structure or hydrologic circumstance often impose sizable additional
construction cost on the project; rarely does more complete information
on these aspects result in a lowering of actual cost from estimated Cost.
It appears reasonable to conclude that the presence of physical uncer-
tainty carries with ita bias toward underestimation of Costs. It is
possible to reduce the degree of such uncertainty at the planning stage
by increasing the information input, although this will entail extra
survey costs.
Although technical uncertainty may be an important factor for a
particular class of projects—storage reservoirs, for example—over-all,
it appears to be much less important as a cause of error than adminis-
trative and institutional factors.
Implications for Policy and Administration
The need for accurate cost estimates as an input to the decision process
is obvious. To the extent that cost estimates for an entire program
(such as the Interstate Highway program) are below actual costs, the
entire schedule will be disrupted in the pressure of a budgetary con-
straint based on the original estimate. When cost estimates for indi-
vidual projects fall well below actual costs, the very worthwhileness
of the project may be undercut.
The fact that significant improvements in performance can be
achieved, as in the water resource examples studied, points to the
conclusion that significant payoffs may be possible through study of the
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over-all management improvement activities. Further, the important role
played by institutional structure in the water-resource case points to
the need for examining this crucial variable. Some specific suggestions
for changes in administration are made below.
THE PLANNING PROCESS. Inadequacies in the planning process
seem to be a larger source of error than preparation of cost estimates
as such. The superficial nature of the surveys and information used as
input to cost estimates has been a major problem. The answer appears
to lie in adoption of an approach much like TVA's that a decision to
proceed on a project (project authorization) must be taken only on
the basis of a reasonably detailed survey. In terms of many public
works programs, such as Corps of Engineers civil works, this may
involve eliminating the project authorization step, and relying on the
appropriation step, as the basis for decision to proceed. In any event,
the solution appears to be in more complete and detailed planning
before firm decisions to build are taken.
THE COST ESTIMATING PROCESS. Even with reasonably detailed
planning and information, uncertainties may still be large at the cost
estimating stage. When the cost of additional information to reduce
uncertainty is prohibitive, project cost data can be presented in terms
of ranges or degrees of accuracy, element by element, and an over-all
range of error noted for the project. This prescription is obviously
applicable to benefit estimates also, and over-all benefit-cost data could
be presented in terms of ranges rather than single-valued estimates.
The important information for decision makers is on the differences
in range of cost and benefit for individual projects and classes of
projects.
More sophisticated use of contingency factors would also provide
a means of increasing accuracy of estimates. The presence of large
contingency factors, on the order of 20 to 25 per cent,is usually
an indication that the information base is inadequate. TVA reports
that the contingency factor is considered to cover the following:
(a) Changes in project scope between planning and design stages,
including adding minor structures, features and systems not
included at the outset;
(b) errors, oversights, and imperfections in estimating methods;
(c)deviations in efficiency of project construction;
(d) variation between estimated and actual cost of equipment and
material.
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With this concept of contingency, TVA has been able to reduce its
contingency factor for large steam plants from a previous range of
10 to 13 per cent to a level of 5 per cent. The point is that con-
tingency factors should not be used as a substitute for detailed cost
estimating. The computation of a contingency factor as a residual,
element by element, would seem to be a desirable practice.
PRICE CHANGES. It would be most desirable to compute costs on
the basis of projected price levels for the labor, materials and equip-
ment components of projects. This is generally the practice of TVA.
Where uncertainty as to the date of construction does not permit such
procedure, estimates could be supplemented by the addition of a
projected price index in order to provide some indication of project
costs according to various possible construction periods. Such a scale
should however also include the increases in nominal benefits(in
fact it would be an adjusted benefit-cost ratio) in order to avoid the
fallacy that a delayed project will necessarily be inferior in terms of
net gain to the nation. The greatest value of such an index, other
than its indication of changes in net benefits, if any, might be simply
to acknowledge in advance the influence of the price factor over the
estimates in order to "protect the record" of the estimating agency.
CHANGES IN ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE. Improvements in
cost estimating could be achieved by fundamental changes in adminis-
trative structure in which regional or river basin agencies were given
general authority such as TVA has to plan, design, construct and
manage a water-resource system subject only to outside control over
appropriations. Short of such sweeping change, there could be more
centralization of the planning and cost estimating task in the division
offices of the Corps of Engineers. Greater competence could be built
in a few estimating staffs than now exists in the many districts. More
fundamental perhaps is a change in the project authorization pro-
cedure which now forces decisions on projects to be made with
inadequate information as to cost. The water resource agencies should
have general authority to include projects in a regional plan, but
actual decision to undertake a project should be deferred until the
appropriation stage. Cost estimates made atthis time should be
reasonably firm because there would be no long delay between com-
pletion of the cost (and benefit) estimates and start of the project.23
23 Robert Haveman reports that an analysis by Terrell Langworthy and him-
self reveals that, for 86 Corps of Engineers projects initiated in fiscal year 1956,
iota!costsas estimated at the appropriations stage and as finally realized were
remarkably close. A substantial variance existed among projects, however.298 The Analysis of Public Output
Suggestions for Further Research
As stated at the outset, the limitations of this study suggest the need
for much further research on this subject. In particular, research is
needed on other major public works programs—highways, public
buildings, water and sewer systems among others—and at other levels
of government—state and local.
In this study, we only touched on the detailed process of cost
estimation as carried out by planning and engineering staffs, includ-
ing such important issues as use of contingency estimates and use of
projected construction costs. Studies of this process should be made
in detail, perhaps using actual cases and tracing through in detail how
the estimates were made and how actual costs varied from estimates
on this detailed basis. A study could also be made of the professionals'
attitudes toward cost estimation. In our interview with TVA per-
sonnel, we noted a professional pride in the agency's good record on
cost estimation and a deep concern for doing a good professional job.
But detailed studies of attitudes and behavior of professionals are
required before one can be definitive about this aspect of cost estima-
tion.
As indicated earlier, our statistical analysis of the available data
was quite crude. A multivariate analysis would seem to be indicated,
but this should probably be done on a much larger sample than we
had available.
Our finding that institutional and management factors probably
have a greater effect on accuracy of cost estimates than technical
factors should be tested by comparative studies of public works
planning. Perhaps the state highway departments are useful places to
begin such studies.
Another subject for useful researchisto study the relationship
between the cost of obtaining additional information and the value of
the increased estimating accuracy. Perhaps data can be obtained on
cases where lack of information on geologic structure at the estimat-
ing stage led to gross underestimation of cost. The cost of obtaining
the necessary geologic information to reveal the essential geologic
structure (and associated cost) could then be related to the decisions
made under the two situations.
In conclusion, it is well to put the problem of cost estimation in its
true perspective. In terms of investment decision making, the esti-Systematic Errors in Cost Estimates 299
mates of money cost of construction are much firmer than are esti-
mates of benefits or consideration of opportunity costs or external
costs. But, as we have shown, variations in accuracy of estimates
between agencies and even between subdivisions of agencies are very
great. It behooves an analyst to know the performance record of the
agency whose project he is examining.
We conclude on a note of hope for the many victims and authors
of gross miscalculations. John Sawyer, in a paper on "Entrepreneurial
Errors and Economic Growth"24 relates how many of our most
important public works would never have been built had it not been
for gross errors in the estimates of their costs and benefits. He cites
among others the British turnpikes and canals of the 18th century,
scores of railroads and canals built in the United States in the 19th
century, and more significantly, the Panama Canal, the Weiland Canal




CAUSES OF INCREASES IN PROJECT COSTSa











Price increases 1,887.9 57.7 71.6
Authorized project extension 576.8 17.6 21.8
Changed local needs 1345 4.1 5.1
Structural and engineering modifications 206.2 6.3 7.8
Unforeseen conditions 279.5 8.5 10.6
Inadequacies in planning and estimating 189.0 5.8 7.1
Total 3.273.9 100.0 124.0
a Datafrom 1951 report.
24 John E. Sawyer, "Entrepreneurial Error and Economic Growth," Explora-




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































FREQUENCY OF OVERRUNS BY ADMINISTRATIVE
DIVISIONS, 1964




















NED 18 78 38 1.03 10 80 1.57
NAD 16 69 19 .88 7 43 .59
SAD 17 41 6 .71 9 22 .61
NCD 26 38 19 .79 13 15 .39
ORD 17 94 35 1.26 5 80 2.09
MRD 15 87 67 .99 2 100 1.10
LMVD 16 75 50 1.10 6 33 1.17
SWD 21 81 19 1.50 7 86 1.38
NPD 10 30 30 1.33 2 100 1.82
SPD 25 87 44 1.14 7 57 1.32
POD 3 67 67 1.01 0 — —
NOTE: The table leads to no firm conclusions but to suggestions of real differ-
ences between divisions because of the large variations in performance between
divisions and the relative consistency of performance within the divisions.
Diflerences between divisions. The differences between minimum values ("best
performance") and maximum values ("worst performance") are considerable for
all indicators:
MinimumMaximum Indicator Value Value
All projects:
Per cent overruns (original estimate) 38 94
Per cent overruns (escalated estimate) 6 67
R 0.71 1.50
Recent projects:
Per cent overruns (original estimate) 15 100
R 0.39 2.09
Consistency within divisions. The same two divisions (South Atlantic and
North Central) rank "best" for all indicators; indicators of "poor" performance
are less concentrated but Ohio River, Missouri River and North Pacific Divisions
rank generally the worst.
Improvement over time. The general improvement noted of more recent
projects does not apply consistently toall divisions; indeed, the two "best"
divisions perform better in the recent projects and the "worst" fare worse.I
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These datamustbe interpreted with care. Some categories are too small to
provide significant information, particularly concerning the most recent per-
formance; and a number of significant factors have not been controlled such as
date of estimate and duration of project.
aDivisionsand Districts
NED: New England (no districts)
NAD: North Atlantic (New York, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Norfolk)
SAD: South Atlantic(Wilmington,Charleston,Jacksonville, Savannah,
Mobile)
NCD: North Central (Chicago, Rock Island, Detroit, St. Paul, Buffalo)
ORD: Ohio River (Nashville, Pittsburgh, Louisville, Huntington)
MRD: Missouri River (Kansas City, Omaha)
LMVD: Lower Mississippi Valley (Memphis, Vicksburg, St.Louis, New K,
Orleans) P1
SWD: South West (Albuquerque, Fort Worth, Galveston, Tulsa, Little Rock)
NPD: North Pacific (Seattle, Portland, Walla Walla, Anchorage)
SPD: South Pacific (San Francisco, Sacramento, Los Angeles)
POD: Pacific Ocean (Honolulu)
b R =Ratioof actual to expected overruns, based on original estimates. Con. W
trols for the different "project mix" of each division. The expected frequency of
overruns in each division is obtained by multiplying the frequency of overruns for
each project type by the number of projects of each type in the division.












Size of Price Esc
(per cent)








30—34 1 174 — — — —
25—29 11 210 336 68 60 68
20—24 27 197 293 154 49 22
15—19 26 102 281 27 175 73
10—14 48 56 196 12 250 79
5—9 61 28 119 9 337 68
0—4 10 9.8 18 1 84 90
NOTE: Mean, maximum and minimum size of price escalator as a function of
project duration (1964 report, all projects).
aTimelapse between original estimate and project completion.
b Per cent difference between Eargest escalator of group and mean.































































































































































Total 48,949 40,271 —17.8
WattsBar DRP 1939&
1941
1946 38,400 32,977 —14.0
(continued)TABLE 5 (CONTiNUED)
Original Final








































1940 1946 28,500 34,941 +22.4
1941 1950 4,400 4,797 +9.1
32,900 39,738+20.6
1933 1939 31,025 30,508 —1.6
1935 1941 19,484 15,923 —18.4
1952 1957 5,900 6,384 +8.5
25,384 22,307 —12.3
1940 1944 31,500 29,765 —5.4
1951 1955 7,200 5,536 —23.6
38,700 35,301 —8.8
1941 1946 6,600 7,988 +21.2
1941 1946 20,000 22,559 +13.0
1941 1946 5,000 7,037+40.0
1952 1957 2,900 2,217 —21.1
7,900 9,254 + 17.7
1941 1946 5,000 5,379 +8.0
1952 1957 3,200 2,655 —18.8
8,200 8,034 —2.4
1941 1948 47,000 70,421 +50.0
1950 1955 3,900 4,310 +10.5
50,900 74,731 +46.4
1942 1945 32,000 40,244+24.4
1942 1950 3,000 2,069 —33.0
1951 1955 4,000 2,959 —27.5
39,000 45,272 + 16.1
1946 1951 29,500 32,369 +9.8
1947 1952 31,500 31,242 —0.9


































































































































Total 190,500 164,467 —13.6


























Total 124,000 105,953 —14.5
Paradise SPg 1959 1966205,000 178,586 —12.9
.1 I a DRP=dam,reservoirandpowerhouse; AGU =additionalgenerating
8
units; SP =steamplant; SGU= additionalsteam generating units.
b Overrun denoted by +, underrun by —.
1.9 cInterestduring construction included in final cost but not in original estimate.
d Interest during construction included in final cost but not in original estimate
of power facilities portion.
L6
eInterestduring construction included for generating unit 8 (original estimate
$68 million) in both original estimate and final cost.
.2 Interest during construction included in final cost but not in original estimate.
gInterestduring construction included in both original estimate and final cost.
r
.1TABLE 6: TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
PERFORMANCE BY PROJECT TYPE, DATE OF











1. Dams and reservoirs 21 10 47.6 1.61
2. Additional hydro-
generating units 19 8 42.0 1.22
3. Locks 4 2 50.0 1.28
4. Channel dredging 1 0 0.0 0.0
5. Multipurpose water control 1 1 100.0 2.50
6. Flood protection 1 0 0.0 0.0
7. Steam plants 9 0 0.0 0.0
8. Additional steam
generating units 5 0 0.0 0.0
All dams (lines 1 and 2) 40 18 45.0 1.30
All steam plants (lines 7 and 8)14 0 0.0 0.0
Others (lines 3, 4, 5, and 6) 7 3 42.8 1.27
Total 61 21 34.4 1.0
Date of appropriation
1933—39 8 0 0.0 0.0
1940—44 14 10 72.0 2.09
1945—49 8 5 62.5 1.85
1950—54 15 2 13.3 0.36
1955—59 8 1 12.5 0.38
1960—64 8 3 37.5 1.08
Actual cost of project (in millions of dollars)
50—260 14 2 14 0.44
10—50 26 7 27 0.77
1—10 21 12 57 1.67
r
a Performance Coefficient =
Number of Overruns in GroupNumber of Projects in Group
Total Number of Overruns Total Number of Projects
bAlmost50 per cent of dams have overruns while steam plants have no over-
runs; the only periods with more than 50 per cent overruns are 1940—44 and
1945—49 (war time and immediately thereafter); the frequency of overruns
appears to decline as project size increases. Caution: no cause-effect relationships
can be determined; the complementarity of these factors is very high: wartime
construction and lower cost ranges are associated with dam construction; recent












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SOURCE: Data from 1964 Report, excluding two projects with overruns of 259

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)NoTe: Adapted from Edward G. Altouney, The Role of Uncertainties in the
Economic Evaluation of Water Resources Projects,Institutein Engineering-
Economic Systems, Stanford University, 1963. (Based on 103 projects; original
estimate.)
FIGURE 6
BUREAU OFRECLAMATION DISTRIBUTION OF ERRORS
1960 REPORT










4 6 8 10









79 projects (exclusive of CRSP and MRBP)
projects at leost 50% complete
(ecciusive of two worst projects)
2
Overrunper cent)3111